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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT COPPER
CORPORATION,

p

^

w /

\
j

VS.

Case No.
13676

THE INDUSTRIAL
C O M M I S S I O N O F U T A H and
I R E N E W. P E A Y , Widow of
J U S T I N W. P E A Y , Deceased,
its.

PLAINTIFFS BRIEF
S T A T E M E N T O F N A T U R E O F CASE
This is an original proceeding before the Supreme
Court of Utah for the purpose of having the lawfulness of an Amended Order dated February 22, 1974
and finalized on April 15, 1974 by the Industrial Commission of Utah in proceedings entitled Irene W. Peay,
Widow of Justin W. Peay, deceased, applicant v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, defendant, File No. 2U5OD-148, inquired into and determined as provided by
§35-2-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
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DISPOSITION BY T H E INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF U T A H
On January 8, 1974, the Industrial Commission of
Utah in Claim No. 2U5-OD-148 issued Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in favor of Kennecott Copper Corporation and against applicant, Irene
W. Peay, Widow of Justin W. Peay, deceased. Irene
W. Peay, on January 10, 1974, filed with the Commission a Motion for Review and on February 22, 1974,
the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Amended
Order in favor of Irene W. Peay and against Kennecott Copper Corporation allowing burial benefits to
applicant Irene W . Peay as widow of Justin W . Peay,
deceased. Kennecott Copper Corporation, plaintiff
herein, on March 13, 1974, filed with the Industrial
Commission of Utah a Motion for Review of the February 22, 1974 Amended Order. The Motion for Review was denied by Order entered by the Industrial
Commission of Utah on April 15, 1974. Plaintiff filed
this action with the Supreme Court of Utah on April
25,1974.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON R E V I E W
Plaintiff, Kennecott Copper Corporation, upon
this review seeks to have the Amended Order issued
by the Industrial Commission on February 22, 1974
set aside in its entirety.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The essential facts pertinent to this controversy are
not in dispute and may be summarized as follows:
Justin W. Peay worked at the Arthur Plant of
plaintiff from March 1913 until June 30, 1956 at which
time he was retired under the pension plan for hourly
employees for permanent and total disability. On June
21, 1956, the Industrial Commission entered a tentative
Order of total permanent disability due to third degree
silicosis with inactive tuberculosis and plaintiff was
ordered to pay weekly compensation benefits to said
Justin W . Peay, beginning July 1, 1956 and continuing for five (5) years thereafter or until further order
of the Commission, but in no event to exceed the then
statutory maximum of $12,100.00 (R. 5). On December 20, 1961, a final Order of permanent total disability was entered by the Commission based upon the
certification from the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation that Justin W . Peay could not be vocationally
rehabilitated (R. 9). Plaintiff in said Order was directed to continue weekly compensation payments until
the statutory maximum of $12,100.00 was paid in full
after which Mr. Peay was placed upon the Combined
Injury Benefit Fund for the remainder of his life.
Justin W . Peay died at the age of 84 on January
11, 1973, almost seventeen (17) years after he last
worked for plaintiff, Kennecott Copper Corporation,
and this claim was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah by his widow, Irene W. Peay, on February 21, 1973 seeking payment of burial bonefits pur3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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suant to §35-2-15 (e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended. Plaintiff contended that as a matter of law,
the provisions of §35-2-13(b) (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, barred the recovery by applicant of any death compensation benefits, including
burial expenses, where, as here, the death of the employee occurred more than five (5) years from the last
day upon which the employee actually worked for the
employer against whom compensation was claimed.
The hearing examiner agreed with plaintiff herein and
on January 8, 1974 issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dismissing the claim for burial
benefits (R. 77). Mrs. Peay's Motion for Review was
filed on January 10, 1974 and the Industrial Commission on February 22, 1974 entered an Amended Order
(Commissioner Stephen Hadley dissenting) in favor
of Irene W . Peay for burial expenses in the amount of
$450.00, said sum being the statutory amount at the
time the employee was determined to be totally and
permanently disabled (R. 82). Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Review on March 13, 1974 (R. 85) ; and a further
Motion was filed in behalf of the applicant on March
14, 1974 (R. 87) claiming that burial benefits should
be allowed in the amount specified by law at the time
of death. The Industrial Commission by Order dated
April 15, 1974 affirmed the Amended Order of Feruary 22, 1974 and denied both Motions for Review
(R. 88). Plaintiff filed this action on April 25, 1974
requesting the Supreme Court of Utah to set aside the
Amended Order of February 22, 1974 issued by the
Industrial Commission of Utah (R. 89).
4
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
S E C T I O N 35-2-13 (b) (3), U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D 1953, A S A M E N D E D , B A R S RECOVE R Y BY D E F E N D A N T OF T H E BURIAL
E X P E N S E S A W A R D E D TO H E R I N T H E
A M E N D E D O R D E R E N T E R E D ON F E B R U A R Y 22, 1974 B Y T H E I N D U S T R I A L COMMISSION OF UTAH.
ARGUMENT
A. THE CLEAR LANGUAGE
AND
INTENT
OF §35-2-13(b) (3) BAR RECOVERY
FOR ALL
COMPENSATION,
INCLUDING
BURIAL
EXPENSES,
UNLESS DEATH FROM SILICOSIS RESULTS
WITHIN
FIFE
YEARS
AFTER TERMINATION
OF
EMPLOYMENT.
Justin W . Peay died on January 11, 1974 almost
seventeen (17) years after he last worked for plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that both the intent and the clear
language of the Utah Occupational Disease Act, §352-13 (b) (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
make it apparent that a claim by Mr. Peay's widow
for death benefits of any kind, including burial expenses, is barred by the provisions of that limitation
statute.
§35-2-13(b) (3) reads as follows:
"There is imposed upon every employer a liability for the payment of compensation to the de5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pendents of every employee in cases where death
results from an occupational disease, subject to
the following conditions:
(3) No compensation shall be paid for death
from silicosis unless the death results within two
years from the last day upon which the employee
actually worked for the employer against whom
compensation is claimed, except:
(a) in those cases where death results during a
period of continuous total disability from silicosis for which compensation has been paid or
awarded, or (b) in those cases where death results from silicosis complicated by active tuberculosis and such silico-tuberculosis is evidenced
by positive laboratory sputum tests and X-rays
and other clinical findings, and in such cases
compensation shall be paid if such death results
within five years from the last day upon which
the employee actually worked for the employer
against whom compensation is claimed" (emphasis added)
I t is apparent from the above that the maximum
time for any compensation for death by silicosis in any
form is five (5) years after the last day the employee
worked for the employer against whom compensation
is claimed. Indeed, for silicosis such as involved herein,
the same limitation has been in existence since the
Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law was first
passed in 1941. The limitation provisions at that time
were found in Chapter 41, Section 13 and read in pertinent part as follows:
"Section 13 — Employer Liability for Compensation-Conditions When no Payment to Be Paid.
6
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(a) There is imposed upon every employer a
liability for the payment of compensation to
every employee who becomes totally disabled by
reason of an occupational disease subject to the
following conditions:
(i) . . .
(2) . . .
(3) No compensation shall be paid in case of
silicosis unless during the ten years immediately
preceding the disablement the injured employee
shall have been exposed to harmful quantities of
silicon dioxide (Si02) dust for a total period of
not less than five years in this state and unless
total disability results within two years from the
last day upon which the employee actually worked for the employer against whom compensation
is claimed.
(4) . . .
(b) There is imposed upon every employer a
liability for the payment of compensation to the
dependents of every employee in cases where
death results from an occupational disease, subject to the following conditions:
(i) . . .
(2) . • .
(3) No compensation shall be paid for death
from silicosis unless the death results within two
years from the last day upon which the employee
actually worked for the employer against whom
compensation is claimed, except in those cases
where death results during a period of continuous total disability from silicosis for which compensation has been paid or awarded, and in such
cases compensation shall be paid if such death

7
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results within five years from the last day upon
which the employee actually worked for the employer against whom compensation is claimed/3
(emphasis added).
(5) . . .
The provisions set forth above became §42-la-13,
Utah Code Annotated until 1953 when it became §352-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The section then,
as now, required reading and interpretation in conjunction with the Definitions set forth in Section 12
(now §35-2-12) and the Benefits listed in Section 15
(now §35-2-15).
Section 12-Terms Construed-Definitions-of
1941 act read as pertinent hereto as follows:

the

"The following terms as used in this act shall be
construed as follows:
(a) . . .
(b) 'Compensation3 shall mean the
and benefits provided for in this act.

payments

(c) 'Award' shall mean the finding or decision
of the commission as to the amount of compensation due any disabled or the dependents of any
deceased employee." (emphasis added).
(d) . . .
And Section 15-Benefits-Amounts.
"The benefits to which a disabled employee or
his dependents shall be entitled under this act
are limited to the following:

8
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(a) W h e r e claim is by the employee he shall be
entitled to and shall receive compensation in the
amount of $12 per week during total disability
plus 5% of such award for each dependent minor
child under the age of eighteen years up to a
maximum of five such dependent children, provided that in no event shall the total of such payments exceed $3,000.
(b) I n case of death the dependents of the deceased employee shall be entitled to and shall receive the difference between the sum paid for
total disability as in paragraph (a) of this section provided and the maximum amount of
$3,000; payments to be made at the rate of $12
per week plus 10% of such weekly payment for
each dependent minor child under the age of
eighteen years up to a maximum of five dependent minor children.
(c) I n the event an employee becomes totally
disabled from an occupational disease, the employer shall furnish and pay for such medical
service, hospitalization and medicines as may be
reasonably required, but not to exceed the sum
of $500.
(d) In case death results from such occupational
disease the employer shall pay not to exceed $150
burial expenses" (emphasis added).
The above provisions, then and now, present a clear
picture of disablement, compensation — including death
benefits, medical expenses and burial expenses — and
the conditions when no payment of any kind need be
paid. Refinements have been made to provide for
such things as partial permanent disability (see §352-12(e), and for disablement [§35-2-13(a) (3) ] or

9
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death [35-2-13(b) (3) ( b ) ] from silicosis complicated
by active tuberculosis, as well as for vocational rehabilitation (§35-2-15), changes in the limitation periods
and benefit amounts, including allowances for death
benefits, medical expenses and burial expenses. The
basic provisions, however, including all those applicable
to this controversy, have remained in effect throughout the life of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law.
The provisions pertinent to this inquiry do not require any sophisticated explanation or interpretation
and may be summarized as follows:
1. Compensation means just what it says in Section
12 (1941 and today) viz: ". . . the payments and benefits provided for in this act.
2. Benefits include the weekly amounts set forth
in Section 15 and include also death benefits, medical
expenses, and burial expenses all of which have been
increased by the legislature from time to time through
the years.
3. The conditions set forth in Section 13 when no
payment need be made mean just what they specify,
viz: no compensation of any kind need be paid under
any of the conditions specified in that chapter.
For example, in a silicosis claim such as that involved herein, subsection (a) of Section 13 (§35-2-13
(a)) sets forth clearly the requirements before disability compensation of any kind need be paid.

10
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(1) Disability must be total (separate provisions
now appear in §35-2-56 for permanent partial disability.)
(2) Exposure requirements — 5 years in this state
during 15 years immediately preceding the disablement.
(3) Disability (total) must result within 2 years
from last day employee actually worked for the employer against whom compensation is claimed (5 years
if silicosis is complicated by active tuberculosis).
(4) Claim must be filed within time fixed by §352-48.
Likewise, subsection (b) of Section 13 [§35-2-13
(b)] establishes with similar clarity the requirements
before compensation of any kind need be paid to dependents where death has resulted to the employee from
silicosis:
(1) Exposure requirements — 5 years during the
15 years immediately preceding disablement.
(2) Death must result within two (2) years after
last day employee actually worked for the employer
against whom compensation is claimed. This 2 year
limitation is extended to 5 years from last day worked
where death results during a period of continuous total
disability and compensation has been paid or awarded
(see subsection (b) (3) of Section 13). There is also
a 5 year limitation in cases where death results from
silicosis complicated by active tuberculosis. However,

11
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both the disability under subsection (a) (3) and the
death under subsection (b) (3) of Section 13 must
result within 5 years, at the most, from the last day
worked in order to qualify for compensation of any
kind under the Utah statute.
(3) Claim for death benefits also must be filed
within time fixed by §35-2-48.
The requirements of the statute set forth above
for silicosis disability and/or death compensation payments have been in effect since 1951; prior to that time,
exposure requirements were more restrictive (5 years in
last 10 years) and there was no provision for silicosis
complicated by active tuberculosis. It seems clear,
therefore, that the limitations for compensation payment were clearly expressed by the Utah Legislature
from the beginning and have continued to be applicable
except as specifically refined or modified since that
time.
One such specific modification is found in Section
26 of the original Act, reading as follows:
"No compensation shall be allowed for the first
seven (7) days of disability, unless such disability continues for a period of more than four continuous weeks, except the disbursements authorized for medical, nurse and hospital services, and
for medicines and funeral expenses, shall be made
by the employer." (emphasis added).
This provision later was amended and became §35-2-25,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as follows:
12
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"No compensation shall be allowed for the first
3 days of disability, except the disbursements
herein authorized for medical, nurse and hospital
services and for medicine and funeral expenses."
In both cases the reference is to "no compensation shall
be allowed. . . . " then the exception is made for medical expenses and burial expenses for special application of that particular section, thus indicating beyond
question that unless excepted, compensation refers to
medical and burial expenses as well as to the weekly
payments.
Another such modification which confirms the literal construction of compensation asserted herein by
plaintiff is found in Section 25 of the original Act,
since repealed, reading in part as follows:
"Compensation when payable under this act, exclusive of medical, hospital and funeral benefits,
for disability or death due to silicosis, notwithstanding anything in this act otherwise provided,
shall be payable to employees, or their dependents, in the following manner and amounts: . . ."
§42-la-25.
Here again, the normal and literal application accorded
to "compensation" has been modified to exclude medical, hospital and funeral benefits for purposes of the
application of that particular statutory provision. The
clear inference which follows from such language is
that compensation includes medical, hospital and funeral expenses for other purposes of the act, just as the
definition specifically expresses.
13
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Finally, reference to the limitations set forth in the
Occupational Disease Act for the filing of compensation claims in Section 49 of the original act (§42-la-49)
and presently found in §35-2-48, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, indicates beyond reasonable
controversy that compensation as used therein includes
all the benefits included in the definition; i.e. weekly
payments, medical and hospital expenses, death benefit payments and funeral expenses. Surely, it could not
reasonably be contended that a claim for "compensation" barred because not filed in time under §35-2-48 is
not barred also for burial expenses or medical expenses
because "compensation" as used in §35-2-48 does not
spell out the inclusion of all the benefits found in §352-15. We submit that "compensation" includes all the
benefits referred to in the definition for purposes of
§35-2-13 here in controversy as well as for §35-2-48;
the language is used in identical fashion in both sections and properly requires the same construction. Indeed, §35-2-13(a) (4) and §35-2-13(b) (5) both refer
to "compensation" claims which must be filed as set
forth in §35-2-48 in order to qualify for any compensation for disability or dearth respectively.
In view of the above, plaintiff Kennecott Copper Corporation asserts that the language of the Utah
Occupational Disease Disability Law is both clear and
consistent (1) with respect to the requirements to be
met in order to qualify for payment of compensation
for disability or death, (2) with respect to the filing of
claims for such compensation and (3) with respect to
14
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the inclusion of burial expenses as compensation under
the proper application of those provisions, including
specifically the application of §35-2-13(b) (3) which
clearly requires that death must result within five (5)
years after termination of employment in order to
qualify for any death benefits, including burial expenses.

B. UTAH SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
SUPPORT PLAINTIFFS
POSITION
THAT
NO COMPENSATION,
INCLUDING
BURIAL EXPENSES,
CAN BE
RECOVERED
UNLESS THE REQUIREMENTS
OF SECTION 35-2-13 HAVE BEEN
SATISFIED.
A plethora of case authority would not be expected for a proposition so obvious and so clearly expressed in the language of §35-2-13 of the Utah Occupational Disease Statute. However, there are clear
indications from Utah Supreme Court decisions that
burial expenses are indeed a part of "compensation"
under the Utah Occupational Disease Law and that
the exposure limitations and the time limitations for
disability and death after termination of employment
set forth in §35-2-13(a) and (b) operate as a bar to
recovery of any compensation under the act unless the
requirements of the section are met.
In Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial
Commission, et al, 118 Utah 46, 218 P.2d 970 (1950),
the Utah Supreme Court applied literally the clear
language of §42-la-13(b) (3) (now §35-2-13(b) (3))
15
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to reverse a death benefit award which included burial
expenses. In that case., the employee died more than
two (2) years but less than five (5) years after his
last day of employment with plaintiff-employer. H e
had filed for compensation for silicosis but no award
had been made at the time of his death.
There was no contention that any part of the
award would not be subject to application of the limitation statute; the issue was whether or not an actual
award was necessary prior to the employee's death in
order to extend the time of death limitation from 2 to
5 years from date of last employment. The court held
that the language was clear and unambiguous and required literal application despite the hardship imposed
in that particular case (118 Utah 56) but stated:
". . . We are mindful of the hardship imposed in
this case, but even so we are powerless to rewrite the statute or escape its effect. . ."
The award was vacated in its entirety including
the amount awarded for burial expenses, indicating
clearly that that item also came within the qualification requirements of §42-la-13(b) (3), which is precisely what plaintiff E^ennecott Copper Corporation
has asserted throughout this controversy.
In Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial
Commission, et al. 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954),
the statute in controversy was, as here, §35-2-13(b) (3).
The Industrial Commission compensation award included medical expenses and burial expenses. The issue
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was whether to apply the silicosis 2 year limitation after
date of last employment under §42-la-13(b) (3) or
the 1951 amendment which added a 5 year limitation
after date of last employment in §35-2-13 (b) (3) (b)
for silicosis complicated by active tuberculosis. There
was no contention that burial expenses or medical expenses or any other portion of the award would have a
longer period than that specified in the applicable statute ; indeed the court stated:
"It is conceded that if the amendment does not
apply, compensation cannot be awarded for the
death of Glade Mitchell inasmuch as his death
occurred more than three years after termination
of his employment with the mining company. . ."
(emphasis added). (2 Utah 2d 4)
We submit that such reference to "compensation"
is consistent with the language of the Occupational
Disease Disability Act and includes-just as the legislature intended-medical and hospital expenses and
burial expenses in addition to weekly benefits. As the
above language indicates, all parties seem to have accepted the interpretation that compensation for death
or disability is not divisible insofar as application of
the requirements of §35-2-13(a) or (b) is concerned.
It is significant to note that in the Mitchell case
described above, the Supreme Court of Utah held that
the dependent widow had a separate and distinct cause
of action which arose at the date of death of the deceased employee and, therefore, the 5 year limitation
"from the last day upon which the employee actually
17
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worked for the employer. . ." applied for determination
of her eligibility for compensation.
Since the deceased employee died within 5 years of
his last day of employment, his dependent widow was
entitled under §35-2-13(b) (3) to compensation which
included also medical expenses and burial expenses. In
this case, however, the dependent widow does not qualify
for any death benefits because 17 years elapsed between the date of death of Justin W . Peay and the last
day upon which he worked for his employer, Kennecott Copper Corporation. The same statute, §35-213(b) (3), is applicable to the claim of Mrs. Peay and
by its clearly expressed terms, no compensation payment need be paid for death benefits, including, of
course, burial expenses.
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court decision in
Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, 113
Utah 415, 196 P.2d 487, (1948) makes it clear beyond
reasonable controversy that "compensation" as used in
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act (as well as
the Occupational Disease Disability Law here involved)
includes burial expenses and medical and hospitalization
expenses in addition to disability payments. The language of the court (113 Utah 427-28) :
" 'Compensation' as used in the amendment to
the Consitution, means the same as it is used and
defined in the compensation act, i.e. any payment required by the act to be made to a workman or to his dependents, or for their benefit, or
into the state treasury for the special purposes
of the compensation act. This includes disability
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payments, death benefits, medical and hospitalization expenses, burial expenses, and payments
into the state treasury as provided by the act. . "
(emphasis supplied) and further:
"The payment of part of decedent's burial expenses . . . in the state treasury in accordance
with the order of the Industrial Commission,
and as provided by statute, was payment of 'compensation' within the meaning of Article X V I ,
Section 5, of the Constitution."
The definition of compensation in the Workmen's
Compensation Act at that time was: "The payments
and benefits provided for in this title" (§42-1-42(6),
Utah Code Annotated, 1943), a definition identical to
that found in the Occupational Disease Disability Law
applicable to this case, viz: (§35-2-12(b)), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.
As indicated above the Henrie case refers to the
tie-in between "compensation" as used and defined in
the Compensation Act and as used in Article X V I ,
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. There is a similar
tie-in relationship in many areas between the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law and the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. For instance, both the Workmen's Compensation Act in §35-1-44(7) and the Occupational Law in §35-2-12(c) define "award" as the
"finding or decision of the Commission as to the amount
of compensation due any injured (disabled) or the dependents of any deceased employee". Obviously, the
"award" and thus the "compensation" includes under
both statutes medical and hospitalization expenses and
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burial expenses in addition to weekly and/or lump-sum
benefit payments. Likewise the term "compensation"
is identical as found in the two acts: §35-1-44(6) in the
Workmen's Compensation Act and §35-2-12 (b) in the
Occupational Disease Law both construing the term in
its broadest sense i.e. the "payments and benefits provided for in this title (act)". Another pertinent and
significant likeness is found in the following limitation
statutes:
Workmen's Compensation §35-1-99:
" . . . .If no notice of the accident and injury is
given to the employer within one year from the
date of the accident, the right to compensation
shall be wholly barred. If no claim for compensation is filed with the industrial commission
within three years from the date of the accident
or the date of the last payment of compensation,
the right to compensation shall be wholly barred."
(emphasis added).
Occupational Disease Law-§35-2-48:
"The right to compensation under this act for
disability or death from an occupational disease
shall be forever barred unless written claim is
filed with the commission within the time as in
this section hereinafter provided: . . . " (emphasis added).
Obviously "compensation" as used above includes
the other benefits, including burial expenses, for the intended application of the limitation provisions of both
acts. Such statutory construction was evidenced in
Masich v. United, States Smelting, Refining & Mining
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Co., et al, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (1948) in which
the Supreme Court of Utah applied former interpretations of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to similar provisions in the
Occupational Disease Act to deny common law remedy
to an employee partially disabled by an occupational
disease, even though the Occupational Disease Act did
not provide compensation for such partial disability.
I n recognizing the relationship between the two Acts
the Court observed that much of the wording of the
Occupational Disease Act was taken from the Workmen's Compensation Act, then stated that: ". . . the intent, purposes and objectives of the Occupational Disease Act, which is closely allied to the Workmen's
Compensation Act, can be determined by reliance on
former interpretations of the Workmen's Compensation Act without searching through the refinements of
construction necessary had the former act not been before the legislature on many occasions . . ." (113 Utah
108). The Court further concluded (p. 123) that "the
legislature occupied the complete field of silicosis. . . ."
and later made the following observation pertinent to
this controversy: ". . .If the legislature can deny the
right to rely on the defense of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk, and make the employer absolutely liable regardless of fault, then we believe it also
has the right to say that compensation shall not be
awarded until the employee has brought himself within
the terms of the statute/' (113 Utah 126) (emphasis
added).
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W e submit that the rationale of the Masich opinion
summarized above supports the application to the Utah
Occupational Disease Act of the Henrie decision (113
Utah 415) and that "compensation" includes burial expenses and medical expenses in the Utah Occupational
Disease Statute as well as in the Utah Constitution and
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. Moreover,
the Masich case indicates clearly that the Utah Legislature did in fact cover the "complete field of silicosis"
and that the legislature has made it clear that compensation shall not be awarded until the employee (or any
dependent seeking compensation) has brought himself
within the terms of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the award of
burial expenses to defendant Irene W . Peay, widow of
Justin W . Peay, deceased, issued by the defendant Industrial Commission of Utah in its Amended Order of
February 22, 1974 was barred by the provisions of §352-13 (b) (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
The conditions qualifying payment of compensation
are clearly set forth in §35-2-13 of the Occupational
Disease Statute; the pertinent definitions which expressly include burial expenses as a part of compensation, are clear and consistent in both language and application; §35-2-13(b) (3) bars compensation of any
kind for death which results more than five years after
termination of employment; Justin W . Peay died almost 17 years after he last worked for Kennecott Cop22
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per Corporation. Under the clear language of the
statute, supported by the decisions and rationale expressed in the Utah Supreme Court cases set forth
above, the claim of applicant, dependent widow of Justin W. Peay, does not qualify for compensation payments of any kind, including burial expenses. Therefore, the Amended Order heretofore entered by the
Industrial Commission on February 24, 1974 and finalized on April 15, 1974 was contrary to law and properly should be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
J A M E S B. L E E
E R I E V. BOORMAN
of and for
PARSONS, B E H L E & L A T I M E R
Attorneys for Plaintiff
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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